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4/1 s«, Ask' - 
I  conceive therefore,   as to the business of being pro- 
found,  that it is with writers as with wells — a 
person with good  eyes may  see to the bottom  of the 
deepest,   provided   any  water be there,   and,   that,   often, 
when there is nothing  In the world  at the bottom,  be- 
sides dryness and dirt,  though it be but a yard and < 
half under-ground,  it  shall pass, however,  for wondrous 
deep,  upon no wiser a reason, than because it is won- 
drous dark. 
Jonathan Swift 
Tale of a Tub 
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INTRODUCTION 
The plight  of poetry today  is  something of which 
too few people are aware at  all,  and with which too many of 
those concerned often deal with a paralyzlngly haavy hand. 
Outside the golden circle of professional literary people 
Is a handful of individuals who, for reasons of their own 
— or, more realistically,  for no "reason" at all — read 
poetry.     The majority  of the population never go near po- 
etry, but hold opinions of the art ranging from vague sus- 
picion to overt distrust (or disgust).    Of those people 
who are exposed to poetry in one form or another as part of 
their formal  education, most learn only to view it much as 
a prisoner views a new and particularly subtle sort of tor- 
ture; the rest,  who may have "liked" poetry when they were 
in school,  would feel  embarrassed if found reading it when 
the "need"  (i.e.,  term of exposure)  no longer exists.    Then 
there is the group of souls who stand  staunchly by the Good 
Old Poetry,   the Poetry  they  could understand   (and  quote by 
the yard, usually), but who have given up completely on the 
modern nonsense of men like Mr.   T.S.  Eliot.     And the oppos- 
ing camp,  though perhaps not so adamant about its position, 
consists of those who are simply delighted with the poetry 
of»  Bay, E.E. Cummings,  but who can see no virtue in poetry 
before World War I — or after World War II. 
What does all  this mean?    Why has poetry been,  In 
effect,   exiled  from human life*  and  1B  It destined  to be- 
come more and more the pursuit of the specially-trained or 
the luxury  of those whose commitments are elsewhere?    The 
cause of the predicament,   it  is generally agreed,   is twen- 
tieth century  science with its Platonic  presuppositions.  We 
live in a science-oriented culture which is,   as  one contem- 
porary critic  says,   "reducing the profoundest utterances of 
man's  spirit  to technological disciplines."1    The same crit— 
lc  states that  if we are to have our poetry  and   our  self- 
respect too,  we must meet the challenge  of science head-on. 
A justification of poetry's  function in life is  imperative, 
and it must be one unlike any that has been made before.   All 
the old theories are impotent in the face of the scientific 
threat:   if the purpose of poetry  is to give us propositions! 
truth,   it must bow out before the more  efficient methods  of 
the laboratory; if some kind  of mystical insight  is what we 
want,  then prose will  serve as well as or better than poetry; 
if pleasure is the only reason for the existence of poetry, 
the market is crowded with more palatable goods;   if it is 
only the "sugar-coated pill"  of moral Instruction,  then it 
was really deceiving us all along and we should be glad to 
1.    Murray Krieger, The New Apologists for Poetry  (Minnea- 
polis! The University of Minnesota Press, 1956), p.   5. 
be rid of it.2 
What is needed,   then,  if poetry is to be "saved," 
is a vantage-point  from  which both  sides  of the situation 
can be seen,  a view which afforded insights such as this in 
1926: 
Thus  a number  of men who might  in other times have been 
poets  are to-day  in bio-chemical laboratories —  a fact 
of which we might avail  ourselves,  did  we feel  the need, 
in defence of an alleged present poverty  in poetry.3 
The author of that statement is a man who has not only been 
in an excellent position for making such observations, but 
also felt profoundly the need for qualified persons to cope 
with the modern-day crisis in poetry. A representative of 
the newest science of his day, a psychologist for whom sci- 
ence alone was not enough, Ivor Armstrong Richards believed 
strongly in the "high place of poetry in human affairs" but 
realized at the same time that 
both a passionate knowledge of poetry   and a capacity  for 
dispassionate psychological analysis are required if 
the explanation of that high place]   is to be satisfact- 
orily prosecuted. 
Neither the professional psychologist,   whose interest  in 
poetry is frequently  not  intense,   nor  the man of letters, 
who as a rule has no  adequate ideas  of the mind  as  a 
whole,  has been equipped for the investigation.^ 
When Richards himself proposed to undertake the investigation 
2. Ibid., pp. 167-81. 
3. I.A. Richards,  Science and Poetry, The Great Critics,   ed. 
James Harry  Smith and Bdd Winfield Parks   (3rd  ed.   rev.; 
New Yorkj  W.W.   Norton & Company,   Inc.,  1951), p.   753. 
4. Ibid., pp. 737-38. 
in 1926 in his Science and Poetry,  however, he was not mak- 
ing exaggerated  claims for himself as meeting his  own qual- 
ifications.    Even those who have harsh words for Richards 
on some counts give him high praise on others: 
Perhaps more than any man since Bacon,   Richards  has 
taken all knowledge as his province,  and his field is 
the  entire mind  of man. 
No treatment of modern literary criticism  is possible 
without discussing Richards,   since in the most literal 
sense Richards  created  it,     What we have been calling 
modern criticism began in 1924, with the publication of 
Principles of Literary Criticism.5 
Given the problem,   then,   of what  seems to many  sens- 
itive minds a clash between science and poetry,   with the 
very real possibility  (if not actuality)  of the extinction 
of the latter,   and working on the assumption that a critical 
examination of poetry may well  bring to light  grounds for 
restoring it to its former "high place in human affairs," I 
shall  in this paper attempt   Just   such an examination.     The 
theories, beliefs,  and  attitudes of I.A. Richards as they 
are found in his major works will  serve as both means and 
ends in my study: means as they shed light on the problem at 
hand,  ends as they prove valuable in their own right. 
5. Stanley Edgar Hyman,  The Armed  Vision  (New York:  Alfred 
A.  Knopf,  19^8),  pp.   315,   307. 
6. The editions referred  to in this paper,   in order  of their 
original publication,  are these: 1923 (with O.K.  Ogden), 
The Meaning; of Meaning  (New York:   Harcourt,  Brace and 
Company,  H.B'.); 1925,  Principles of Literary Criticism 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company,  H.B.); 1926, 
Science and Poetry,  The Great Critics,  ed.  James Harry 
Smith  and Edd Winfield Parks  (3rd   ed.   rev*;  New York:  %. 
W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1951). 
If my use  of Mr.  Richards as  a focus  for this    In- 
quiry should result  at  the same time in an increased  aware- 
ness of a man whose worth is all  too often spoken of in the 
past tense,  I  shall not be unhappy. 
I.     HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The question of the proper place of poetry in man's 
life Is  an old  one.     The  earliest   solution of  the problem, 
so far as we know,  is found in a theory of ideal government 
— Plato's Republic.    In this Utopia there would be no poets, 
and the reasons for which Plato would  banish them  form  an 
interesting contrast to the reasons for which other critics 
would keep them.    Although Plato is often referred to as an 
"idealist,"  he is  in fact  a realist — but we must  qualify 
this by  saying that Plato's is  a realism  of ideas.     In Book 
Ten of the Republic,     Plato criticizes poetry  for two rea- 
sons: first,  it is at a third-remove from the true,  or ideal 
(which  is,   for Plato,   the real);   second,  poetry  "feeds and 
waters the passions instead  of drying them up;   she lets them 
rule,  although they ought to be controlled,  if mankind are 
ever to increase in happiness and virtue."?    Poetry,  then, 
with its deleterious effects on the emotions and its perver- 
sions of the truth,  seems to Plato to work in opposition to 
man's reason, which alone can show him the good life. 
If, for Plato, poetry was a seductress (a lying se- 
ductress), for Aristotle she was something quite different. 
Far from doing away with poetry  altogether,  Aristotle as- 
-••■■*- V :.&-J 93--'*   -■     -     -■-■»"■: -a*     • : *> 
7.    The Republic of Plato, trans., B.  Jowett, The Q-reat Criti' 
lcs.   ed.  James Harry Smith and Bid Winfield Parks (3rd 
ed. rev.;  New Yorkt W.W. Norton & Company,  Inc.,  1951), 
p.   22. 
signed to it —  or to that best part of it known as tragedy 
— an important place in human affairs.     In his Poetics he 
explains the function of tragedy in his famous definition* 
Tragedy,  then,  is an imitation of an action that is 
serious,   complete,   and   of a certain magnitude;   in lan- 
guge embellished with each kind of artistic ornament, 
the several kinds being found in separate parts of the 
play;  in the form of action,  not of narrative; through 
pity and fear effecting, the proper purgation of these 
emotions.  (Italics mine)  " 
This is,  of course,   Aristotle's well-known notion of cathar- 
sis (although the word itself,  interestingly  enough,  does 
not appear in this translation);  and while in this context 
it refers to tragedy (in dramatic form)  as distinguished 
from the other great "category11 of poetry,  epic, we shall 
keep it in mind and  find it in somewhat more general use in 
recent literary  theory.     Tragedy  evokes  in us the opposite 
emotions of pity and fear,  holds them in some kind of bal- 
ance (though Just how it does this is the secret of the 
playwright),  and through this process,  ultimately, purges 
or cleanses us  of what would  otherwise be "unhealthy"   (in 
that they are excessive)  emotions.     If poetry was for Plato 
a seductress,  then,   she seems for Aristotle to have been 
some kind of a nurse. 
All poetry,   according to Aristotle,   springs from 
two deep-rooted causes*  the imitative instinct and the 
8.    Aristotle Poetics,  trans.,  S.H. Butcher, The Or eat Crit- 
ics,  ed. James Harry Smith and Bid Winfield Parks (3rd 
ed.  rev.;  New York! W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1951), 
p.   34. 
Instinct for rhythm and "'harmony.'"9    While a great deal 
has been written and said about the first of these (in Plato 
as well as in Aristotle),  it is not necessary for our pur- 
poses to set forth any one theory of mimesis,  or imitation 
— except to say what it is not,  which is the naive inter- 
pretation of the word as simply copying or mirroring life. 
On the contrary,  imitation is for Aristotle a very creative 
thing I it is not only natural, but somehow necessary for 
man to recreate life,  i.e., write poetry;  it is an activity 
based,  first of all,  on instinctual  elements of man's person- 
ality.     The great  emphasis which Plato placed  on "truth"  in  I        -/- 
poetry is here shifted to an emphasis on credibility!  "iti 
Is not the function of the poet to relate what has happened, 
but what may happen — what is possible according to the law 
of probability or necessity."    It is for this reason,  that 
poetry is not bound to the fact,  to truth in any scientific 
sense, that Aristotle considers it a t'mgfce philosophical and 
a higher thing than history."10    Plato,   it  seems,  by  admit- 
ting to his Republic only "hymns to the gods and praises of 
famous-men," would reduce poetry to something very much        7 
like history* 
For if you go beyond this and allow the honeyed muse to 
enter,  either In epic or lyric verse,  not law and the 
reason of mankind, which by common consent have ever 
been deemed best,  bui.pleasure and pain will be the 
rulers in our state. 
9. Ibid.. p.   31. 
10. Ibid., p.  37. 
11. TJie Republic   of Plato,  loc.   cit. 
Diametrically  opposed to Plato's view of poetry,   awl 
more emphatic  than Aristotle's,   is the stand Matthew Arnold 
took  and  expressed  in "The Study  of Poetry"   (1888)j 
"The future of poetry is immense, because in poetry, 
where it is worthy of its high destinies,  our race,   as 
time goes on, will find an ever surer and surer stay. 
There is not a creed which is not shaken,  not an accred- 
ited dogma which  is not  shown to be questionable,  not  a 
received   tradition which does not  threaten to dissolve. 
Our religion has materialised itself in the fact,  in 
the supposed  fact;   it has  attached  its  emotion to the 
fact,   and now the fact  is failing it.    But  for poetry 
the idea  is  everything;   the rest  is  a world  of illusion, 
of divine illusion.    Poetry attaches its emotion to the 
idea;  the idea Is the fact.    The strongest part of our 
religion to-day  is  its unconscious poetry."12 
Arnold quotes these words of his own at the beginning of his 
essay, as the attitude toward powtry which, he things, 
should guide  any  study  of it — whether in English,   as  is 
the case in his  essay,   or in some other language.     He feels 
that we need to hold a higher opinion of poetry and consid- 
er it "capable of higher uses,   and called to higher destin- 
ies,   than those which in general men have assigned to it 
hitherto."    For,  according to Arnold,  as religion fails and 
philosophy fails (and we "wonder at ourselves for having 
taken them seriously"),  "more and more mankind will discover 
that we have to turh to poetry to interpret life for us, to 
12.    Matthew Arnold,   "The Study  of Poetry,"  The G-reat Critics, 
ed.   James Harry  Smith and  Bid Winfleld Parks   (3rd   ed. 
rev.;   New York*  W,W.  Norton & Company,   Inc.,  1951),  '-•• 
p.   624. 
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console us, to sustain us."13 
What happened  in the more than 2,000 years  separat- 
ing Arnold from Plato and Aristotle in time that  should 
bring about  such a different  attitude toward the importance 
of poetry?    The  answer lies in that troublesome ere  of the 
Victorians  in which  Arnold found himself:  the Industrial 
Revolution,  higher criticism  of the Bible,   Darwinian theory, 
the Reform Bill  of 1832   (extending   suffrage,  and  thus polit- 
ical1, and   social  power,   to the middle class),   scientific dis- 
coveries  of all  kinds — Matthew Arnold  felt the impact of 
these things more keenly,   and  responded  to them more honest- 
ly,  than did  most  of his contemporaries.     If we can accept 
Arnold's  own poetry  as  an index  of his critical position, 
Lionel Trilling's observations may be helpful: 
Arnold's poetry in its most characteristic mood is ele- 
gaic — it mourns a loss,  celebrates the lost thing,  and 
tries to come to terms with the deprivation.    What is 
the thing that is grieved  for?    The contemporary  reader 
of English literature need  not be long over this  ques- 
tion.     He will   quite easily  see that Arnold's loss is 
much the  sane as that which is  at  the center of the 
thought  and  feeling  of  such modern writers  as T.S.   Eliot, 
D.H.  Lawrence,   and W.B.  Yeats.     It  is the loss of a cer- 
tain culture — that is to say,  af a certain body of 
assumptions,  a certain way  of looking at*,the world  and 
of responding to it,  a certain quality  of  temperament 
which seems no longer available. 
For Arnold,  as for so many intellectuals of his time, 
the essential  element of this  sense  of loss was the dim- 
inution of the intensity  of religious faith.     Arnold's 
age was not  an irrellgi'ous age — indeed,  a case might 
be made out for its having been one of the notable ep- 
ochs  of religious intensity.     And Arnold himself was by , 7 
13.     Ibid.,  pp.   624-25. 
11 
a man without religious faith.    But we may say of the 
religion of Arnold's day  that it was  of a kind  that did 
not  suffuse the consciousness of men of intellect.     It 
was  not  an element of their  Imaginations,   although  it 
might be an element   of their morality  or  of their dis- 
ciplined  thought.1* 
Trilling goes on to explain how,   to the Victorian poets, 
"something had  gone out  of the universe,   some  element  of 
wonder,   of mystery,   of life Itself."     Arnold he places  in 
the tradition of the Romantic poets Blake,  Coleridge,  Words- 
worth,   Shelley  -- poets  who "were not  in themselves  essen- 
tially  religious,"  though they were  seeking  (as  are ELiot, 
Lawrence,   and Yeats)   "to reanimate a world  from which the 
animating  Imagination of religion had withdrawn."    These 
poets,  Trilling points out,  were all  concerned  less with 
religion p_er  se than with validating  "man's power to feel." 
The fear  of the loss  of the power to feel  —  this  is 
one of the great themes  of the literature of the last 
century  and  a half.     For Arnold,   as  for the more re- 
cent writers.. .mentioned,  the instinctual life is 
depressed  and attenuated by the pre-eminence of ra- 
tionality .15 
14. Lionel Trilling,   "Matthew Arnold,"  Major British Writ. 
ers,   gen.   ed.   G-.B.   Harrison  (enlarged  ed.:   New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959), II.  585-86. 
15. Ibid., p.   586. 
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II.      RICHARDS AND THE PROBLEM 
It is  Just this  "pre-eminence of rationality,"  and 
Its debilitating  effect  on the instinctual  life,  that con- 
cerned I.A.  Richards in 1926,  when he said  "the whole tradi- 
tional  analysis  of the working of the mind  has been turned 
upside down."    By this  he meant  that man has  stressed his 
intellectual   capacities   entirely too much;   although they  are 
indeed  important,  they   are not primary,     "intelligence helps 
man but does  not run him."    Man is,   in reality,   "a system 
of interests";  his intellect is merely an adjunct  to them. 
Richards goes one step   further,   however,   and  says  "it  is 
largely  as a remedy  from the difficulties which this mistake 
involves that poetry mayhkv*1  so much importance in the fui- 
ture."l6 
We can see,   then,   that in the book which Richards 
devoted  to remedying this difficulty,   Science and Poetry,   it 
is not by accident he begins with  the  quotation from  Matthew 
Arnold which begins  "The future of poetry  is immense...."1? 
This  elevation of poetry  to a place of first  Importance, 
followed logically  by the need  for  a valid criticism  to dis- 
tinguish between the "excellent and inferior,   sound and un- 
sound or only half-sound,  true and untrue or only half-truej,"1" 
Bad 
16. Richards,  Science and Poetry, loc. cit., pp.  7^2-43. 
17. Supra, p. 7. 
1©.     Arnold,   "The Study  of Poetry," ^oc.   cit.,   p.   625. 
13 
and based  on the insistence that the rational  and   intel- 
lectual has been traditionally over-emphasized,  is char- 
acteristic  of both Richards and Arnold.    But if Richards 
has many of the ideas and attitudes of Arnold, he is at 
the same time  something Arnold  could not have dreamed  of 
being.     Arnold  had  all  the concern for the conflict Tbe- 
tween science and poetry,  religion and poetry,   critics 
and poetry,   that is the starting-point  for much of Rich- 
ards'  best  work;  living in an  age which  saw the beginning 
of what  seemed to be the  end  of religion and perhaps  even 
of poetry,   he was convinced that  only poetry could   save 
men— but  he was without the tools  to  shape a solid  ve- 
hicle for his  conviction.     In an age without psychology, 
without linguistic  analysis  (without,   too,   a certain 
"toughness"   of mind which comes,  perhaps,   from being born 
in a scientific  age rather than having to  see it born), 
Matthew Arnold   was crippled by history.     I.A.  Richards, 
on the other hand,  had the advantages  of a psychology which 
enabled him  to do invaluable work  in both  semantics  and 
literary criticism. 
In order to understand his efforts to right the 
"upside-down"   analysis of the mind  and thereby restore 
poetry to its  rightful place in human affairs,  we must fi 
first understand certain of Richards'  ideas.    Underlying 
them all is his emphasis on the importance of language, 
which must be separated and understood in its dual func- 
14 
tions  (symbolic  and   emotive)  before progress can be made 
in any direction;   and basic  to his  theory  of symbolism — 
known as the referential  theory  of meaning  —  is  a behav- 
iorlstic  theory  of signs  (that  all  knowledge and percep- 
tion consists  of  sign-interpretation).     Once the  essential 
ambiguity  of the language-medium  Is understood  and   its 
two uses  are separated,   the  subsequent distinction between 
beliefs  and  attitudes can be made — with the accompanying 
notion of "pseudo-statement."    The way is then clear for 
Richards'  poetics,  including his view of poetic truth and 
the unique way in which poetry  functions  as  an organizer 
of neurological impulses.    All this is set in the larger 
framework  of Richards'   view  of the world predicament 
(brought  about by what he calls  the Neutralisation of Na- 
ture)   and his  system  of values,   based  In brief on the as- 
sumption that  experience is —   and must be —  its  own 
Justification. 
Referential Theory| 
Basic  to  all  Richards'   other theories is his ref- 
erential theory of meaning.    It is propounded,  along with 
a good many  other things,   in the monumental   (one almost 
wants to say  omniscient)  Meaning of Meaning,  which Richards 
wrote with C.K. Ogden in 1923.    This pioneer work in seman- 
tics is significant today, in spite of all  the work that 
has been done in the field;  the distinction made in the o 
book between symbolic  and emotive uses of language has had 
15 
far-reaching   effects —  although many critics who accept 
the distinction itself are unable to accept as valid the 
use Richards himself makes  of it  in his poetic theory. 
One of the several linguistic  "evils"  which Ogden 
and Richards   set  out to make semantic war upon is the  er- 
roneous but still  widely held belief that words have any 
meaning in or of themselves.    Words  are instruments,  and 
"it is only when a thinker makes use of them that they 
stand  for anything,   or,   In one sense,  have  •meaning.'"     In 
addition to this referential  use»   however,  for which "all 
reflective,   intellectual  use of language should be para- 
mount,  words have  other functions which may be grouped 
together  as  emotive."    While Ogden  and Richards by no 
means minimize the importance of the emotive functions, 
their book deals primarily with an  examination of the  sym- 
bolic   (or referential  or  scientific)   function because,   thjpy 
feel, the non-symbolic or emotive functions can "best be 
examined when the framework of the problem of strict state- 
ment  and intellectual   communication has been set up. "19 
Any explanation of the referential theory which 
would do Justice to its authors is out of the question 
here;  not only would the problems in connection with lan- 
guage multiply beyond our ability to solve them, but our 
19. O.K.  Ogden and I.A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1923), p.  10 
16 
original direction would  almost certainly be lost.     Yet 
it is difficult  to leave the book without  saying more than 
has been said.     To illustrate their causal  theory  of mean - 
ing»  Ogden and Richards make use of their  famous reference- 
symbol-referent triangle;  its purpose is to show the rela- 
tionship between thought   (reference) .words   (symbols),   and 
things   (referents).     They wish   to  show that the only rela- 
tion between a word   and the "thing"   (not necessarily phys- 
ical,   as  some mlsinterpreters have supposed)it represents 
is for the most part2*  arbitrary;  they refer over and over 
to the indirectness  of the relation which holds between 
symbol  and referent,   and devote their  second chapter,"The 
Power of Words,"  to  an historical   examination of the human 
tendency to believe in some mysterious   or magical   quality 
of words. 
This belief in a direct (i.e.,   natural  or necessary) 
relation between a word  and  its referent can be seen very 
often in superstiti&ne-- centering on names| for example, 
"every ancient Egyptian had two names — one for the world, 
and another by which he was known to the supernal powers." 
And hardly a religion can be found in which there is no 
mystical  significance in names  ofthe deity*  "the true and 
great name of Allah is a secret name,"  as arejthe names of 
the gods of Brahmanism and the  "res!  name"   of Confucius; 
20.    Exceptions*  onomatopoeic words, images, gestures, dr 
drawings. 
17 
the name Jahweh is apparently avoided by  orthodox Jews al- 
together.21    If the instrumentality of words is on* of the 
main "doctrines"   of The Meaning of Meaning;,  the misuses  and 
abuses  of linguistic machinery  is  another.     Three pitfalls 
of language are discussed in the chapter "The Theory of Def- 
inition" — the Phonetic  subterfuge,  the Hypostatic subter- 
fuge,  and  the Ultraquistic  subterfuge;  in addition to these 
are the Irritants,   the Degenerates,   the Mendicants,   and  the 
Nomads.     But perhaps the most common example of this  "peop- 
ling of the universe with spurious entities,  the mistaking 
of symbolic  machinery  for referents,"  occurs  in the case of 
Unlversals.     "Classes  are now recognized as  symbolic  fictions, 
and logistlclans will  only be logical when they admit that 
unlversals are an analogous convenience."22    Universal "qual- 
ities"  and universal "relations,"  according to the authors, 
arise in the same manner and present the same temptation. 
The occurrence of  similars does  not compel  us to recog- 
nize 'similarity, '  a universal,  any more than the occur- 
rence of knowledge forces us to recognize    Jac-facuity of 
knowing.    It merely compels us to recognize that similars 
do occur.     That things are similar is natural knowledge. 
To make it, by exploiting the economy of symbolisms,  in- 
to a basis  of metaphysical knowledge — into a proof of 
another world of pure being where entities   •subsist' but 
do not exist — is unwarrantable.    No argument about the 
world is valid if based merely upon the way a symbol 
system behaves." 
21. The Meaning of Meaning, p. 28. 
22. ibid.,  pp. 94-95. 
23. Ibid.,  p.   97. 
18 
But what does all  this mean in more practical terms?    It 
means that people  are liable to  "a misunderstanding  of the 
function of symbolic  accessories  such as   'liberty*   or   'red- 
ness, ' so that in making a reference to free actions or red 
things the user supposes himself to be ref filer ing to some- 
thing not  In time and  space."24    It is  common practice to 
treat such words  as  "freedom,"   "democracy,"   "love,"   "truth," 
"beauty"  in Just this way. 
There is  still another factor working for confusion 
in these terms,  however;   and  it will  serve to bring us back 
to the point at which  (and for which)  we  entered this whole 
complex areaj   confusion of the two language-functions.     Ogden 
and Richards admit to the difficulty in distinguishing 
"whether  a particular  use of  symbols is primarily  symbolic 
or emotive," but think 
the distinction which is  important  is that between utter- 
ances  in which  the symbolic   function is  subordinate to 
the emotive    act and those of which the reverse is true. 
In the first case, however precise and however elaborate 
the references communicated may be,  they can be seen to 
be present  in an essentially  instrumental  capacity,   as 
means tolemotive effects.     In the second case,  however 
strong the emotive effects,   these can be seen to be by- 
products not  essentially  involved  in the speech transac- 
tion.     The peculiarity of  scientific   statement,   that re- 
cent   new development,of linguistic   activity,   is Its re- 
striction to the symbolic function. 
One of the dangers  of language,  to the person who is not   ■ • 
aware of the ambiguity of the medium,  is that of mistaking 
"words which have been erroneously regarded without question 
24.    Ibid., p.  95. 
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as symbolic  in function."    The word  good  is taken as  an ex*- 
treme example and  shown,   upon analysis,   to be a "symbolic- 
ally blank but  emotively  active"  word,   with which,  Ogden 
and Richards  say,   "many  of the most popular subjects  of dis- 
cussion are infested."25 
Richards discusses the  same problem —  as it relates 
to criticism  —  in Principles  of Literary Criticism;   in a 
chapter on "The Language of Criticism" he speaks  of  "that 
paralysing apparition Beauty,  the ineffable,   ultimate,   un- 
analysable,   simple Idea"  which  "has at last been dismissed 
and with her have d-parted  or will  soon depart a flock  of 
equally bogus  entities."    He goes  on to name some of these 
other Mystic Beings — Construction,  Design,  Form, Rhythm, 
Expression —   and   says they  are  "more often than not mere 
vacua in discourse,   for which a theory  of criticism  should 
provide explainable substitutes."    It is the "insidious pow- 
er of grammatical  forms"  thfet leads to the belief in    some 
"quality  or  attribute,   namely Beauty,  which attaches to the 
things we rightly call  beautiful,"   and Richards says this 
"is probably inevitable for all reflective persons at a cer- 
tain stage of their mental development."    But  the habit is 
not an easy  one to outgrowi 
Even  among those who have  escaped  from thfcs delusion 
and are well   aware that we continually talk as though 
things possess  qualities,  when what we ought to  say is 
that they cause effects in us of one kind or another, 
the fallacy  of  'projecting'  the effect  and making  it  a 
25.    Ibid.,  pp.   124-25. 
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quality  of its cause tends  to recur.     When it does  so it 
gives a peculiar  obliquity  to thought and   although few 
competent persons  are nowadays  so deluded   as actually to 
hold  the mystical   view that there is a quality Beauty 
which  Inheres  or  attaches  to external  objects,  yet 
throughout all the discussion of works of art the drag 
exercised by language towards this view can be felt.     It 
perceptibly increases the difficulty of innumerable 
problems and we shall  have constantly to  allow for it. 
Such terras  as   'construction',   'form1,   'balance',   'com- 
position',   'design',   'unity',   'expression*,   for  all  the 
arts;   as    depth',   'movement',   'texture',   'solidity',   in 
the criticism  of painting;   as   'rhythm',   'stress',   'plot', 
'character*,  in literary criticism;   as 'harmonje',   'at- 
mosphere',   'development',   in music,   are instances.     All 
these terms  are currently used  as though they stood  for 
qualities  inherent in things outside the mind,   as  a 
painting,   in the   sense of  an assemblage of pigments,   is 
undoubtedly  outside the mind.     Even the difficulty of 
discovering,   in the case of poetry,   what thing other 
than print  and paper is there for these alleged   Quali- 
ties to belong to,  has not  checked the tendency.2" 
If these words do not  "mean"   in criticism what they 
are all   too often believed to mean, whst is  their  func- 
tion?    Richards does  not  seem  to be assigning to them a 
purely   or  even primarily  emotive meaning  (as  indeed he seems 
to do with  "Good");   It is  obvious that  they  are used,   and 
must therefore have some function in criticism — what does 
Richards  suggest  as the "explainable  substitutes"  which he 
says should be provided by a theory of  criticism?    The 
answer  to this is bound up with a view of Richards'   which 
we shall meet again and again,  and which has brought him 
adverse criticism:  for Richards, there is no such thing as 
an "aesthetic  object,"  and there is no  "aesthetic  state." 
26.    I.A.   Richards,   Principles  of Literary Criticism   (New 
York:  Harcourt,  Brace and Company,  KBIT, PP» 19-21. 
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There are simply   experiences —  of more or less value,   to be 
sure (we shall discuss criteria later);   and poetry is one of 
them, different only in degree from any other. 
Most critical  remarks  state in an abbreviated  form that 
an object  causes/certain  experiences,   and  as a rule the 
form  of the statement is such   as to  suggest  that the ob- 
ject has been said to possess certain qualities.    But 
often the critic  goes further  and  affirms that the  ef- 
fect  in his mind Is due to some special  particular fea- 
tures  of the object.     In this  case he is pointing  out 
something about  the object in addition to its  effect 
upon him,   and this fuller kind   of criticism  is whet we 
desire.     Before his insight can greatly benefit,  how- 
ever,   a very clear demarcation between the  object,   with 
its features,   and his  experience,  which is  the effect 
of contemplating it,   is necessary.     The bulk  of critic- 
al literature is  unfortunately made up  of their confu*- 
sion. 
Thus the real problem lies in treating "words which are use- 
ful,  indeed  invaluable,   as handy  stop-gaps  and makeshifts 
in conversation,   but which need  elaborate expansions before 
they can be used with precision"   as if they were "people's 
proper names."27 
Pseudo- st at em ents I 
While we may  seem to have wandered  far  afield,   we 
actually have not;  but we have been more concerned with the 
results  of confusing  the two functions  of language than with 
their separation and clarification.    Ogden and Richards are 
insistent  about  the fact that the two functions,   if tfepj 
are kept distinct from each other,  need  not interfere in any 
way with the  exercise of  either. 
27.     Ibid.,  pp.  22-23. 
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The Bight  of persons  irritated with  science because 
they care for poetry  ("Whatever the sun may be,  it is 
certainly  not  a ball  of flaming gas,"  cri«d D.H.  Law- 
rence),   or  of  scientists totally immune from  the influ- 
ence of civilization    £il  e.,   the arts]   ,  becomes   still?8 
more regrettable when we realize how unnecessary  it is. 
To understand Richards'  poetics  —  our "ultimate 
goal," to ma'<e use of a linguistic  fiction — it is neces- 
sary  to follow the distinction he makes between "scientific 
statement,  where truth is ultimately a matter of verifica- 
tion as this  is understood  in the laboratory,   and   emotive 
utterance,   where   'truth'   is primarily  acceptability bv. some 
attitude,   and more remotely is the acceptability  of this 
attitude itself."    Thus the question of  "truth"  arises;   and 
what Richards means by it in connection with  emotive  state- 
ments is found   in his concept  of  "pseudo-statement."     He 
tells us that 
it is  not the poet's business to make true statements. 
Yet poetry has constantly the  air  of making  statements, 
and  important  ones;  which is  one reason why  some mathe- 
maticians cannot read it. 
They approach poetry as if it contained Jiruth in the scien- 
tific  sense,   and  "find the alleged  statements to be false*" 
The difficulty,  Richards  explains,   stems from the fact that 
while science makes statements,  poetry makes  pseudo-state- 
ments.     And he is very  explicit  about what the limitations 
of a pseudo-statement  are not* 
The usual account is in terms  of a supposed universe of 
discourse,  a world of make-believe,  of imagination,  of 
28.     The Meaning;  of Meaning,  p.  159. 
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recognised  fictions  common to the poet  and his readers. 
A pseudo-statement which  fits  into this   system  of as- 
sumptions would be regarded   as "poetically true";   one 
which does not,   as "poetically false."    This  attempt to 
treat   "poetic truth"  on the model  of general  "coherence 
theories" is very natural for certain schools of logi- 
cians;  but  is  inadequate,   on the wrong lines from the 
outset.     To mention two objections out  of many;   there is 
no means  of discovering what the "universe of discourse" 
is on. any occasion,   and the kind  of coherence which must 
hold within it,   supposing it to be discoverable,  is not 
an affair of logical relations.     Attempt to define the 
set  of propositions  into which 
"0 Rose,  thou art sickj • ii 
must  fit,   and the logical  relations which must hold be- 
tween them  if it  is  to be "poetically true";  the absurd- 
ity  ofjthe theory becomes   evident. 
If the proper  approach to poetic pseudo-statement  is not 
logical  (or only "occasionally and by accident" logical), 
what is  it?     According to Richards,   "the acceptance which  a 
pseudo-statement receives  is  entirely governed by  its  ef- 
fects upon our feelings and attitudes."    And again,   "a 
pseudo-statement is   'true'   if it  suits  and  serves  some atti- 
tude or lfcnks together attitudes which on other grounds are 
desirable."    At this point Richards makes a statement which 
critics  of his view would do well to take into consideration! 
"This kind  of truth  is  so opposed  to scientific  truth that 
it is a pity to use so similar a word, but at present it is 
difficult to avoid  the malpractice." 
A pseudo-statement  is  a form  of words which is   Justified 
entirely by its  effect in releasing or organising our 
impulses and  attitudes...;   a statement,   %n the  other hand, 
is Justified by.its truth,  i.e^.its correspondence,  in a 
highly technical  sense,  with the fact to which it points.* 
29.    Richards,  Science and Poetry, pp.  756-57. 
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Neurological  Organization: 
If poetry consists  of pseudo-statements,   then,   and 
these release or  organize our  impulses and attitudes,  we 
must define three terms before we go  on:  impulse,   attitude, 
and — the key  to the "meaning"   of Richards'  whole aesthet- 
ic —  organization*   In Richards'   behavloristic psychology, 
an impulse is  "the process  in the course of which  a mental 
event may  occur,   a process  apparently beginning  in a  stim- 
ulus  and  ending  in an act." 
Of the possible  stimuli  which we mi^ht at  any moment 
receive,   only a few  actually  take  effect.     Which  are 
received  and  which impulses  ensue depends upon which 
of our  interests is  active,   upon the general  set,   that 
is,   of our activities.     This Is conditioned  In a large 
degree by the  state,   of  satisfaction or unrest,   of the 
recurrent and persistent needs  of the body. 
A stimulus then must  not be conceived   of  as   an alien 
intruder which thrusts  itself upon us  and,   after worm- 
ing a devious way  through  our organism  as through a 
piece of cheese,   emerges at  the other end as  an aet. 
Stimuli  are  only received  if they  serve some need  of the 
organism  and  the form which  the response to  them takes 
depends only in part upon the nature of the stimulus, 
and  much more upon what the organism   'wants',   I.e.  the 
state of  equilibrium of its multifarious  activities.-^ 
If this  Is  an impulse,   what does Richards mean by  attitude? 
This  is   a crucial  element in his  analysis of the poetic   ex- 
perience,   and  is perhaps best   explained  in Science and 
Poetry.   In his  step-by-step description of the reading of a 
poem: 
Signs on the retina,  taken up by   sets  of needs   (remember 
how many  other  impressions  all day long remain entirely 
30.    Richards, Principles of Literary Criticism, pp. 86-87. 
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unnoticed "because no interest  responds to them);   thence 
an  elaborate agitation of impulses,   one branch of which 
is thoughts  of what the words mean,   the other an  emo- 
tional  response leading to the development   of attitudes, 
preparations,   that is,   for  action which may   or may  not 
take glace;   the two branches being in intimate connec- 
tion.^1- 
Thus  an attitude is  itself  one kind  of "impulse"?   an impulse 
towards some kind  of behavior which  is  set off by the poem 
(itself a stimulus)  —  or,  rather,  by  an emotional reaction 
to the poem,  but which oannot be acted  out. 
In a fully developed  man a state of readiness for  action 
will take the place of  action when the full   appropriate 
situation for action is  not present?2    The eseefctial 
peculiarity  of poetry  as of  all  the arts is that  the full 
appropriate situation is  not present.   It  is  an actor we 
are seeing upon the stage,  not Hamlet.     So readiness  for 
action takes the place of actual  behaviour.33 
Value System? 
"Organization" is probably the single most important 
word in the writings  of I.A.   Richards.     It provides the link 
between his  system   of values  and his theory  of poetry,   and 
at the  same  time allows us  to draw a  significant parallel  be- 
tween his  ideas and  those of his predecessor,  Aristotle.     For 
Richards,   a poetic   experience is to be considered  valuable 
(when it  is-)  for the same reasons as is  any  other  experience, 
because —  violent  though his opposition may be  on this point 
— for Richards,   a poem is simply an experience, different in 
31. Richards,  Science and Poetry,  p.  7^2. 
32. Italicized in the original. 
33. Ibid.,  p.  7^2. 
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degree rather than in kind  from  other   experiences.     And  what 
are his criteria for  Judging  experiences generally?    "If 
the mind  is  a system  of interests,   and if an experience is 
their play,   the worth of any  experience is a matter  of the 
degree to which the mind,  through  this  experience,  attains 
a complete equilibrium."    The best  experience is  one that  is 
organized   so as to bring as many  as possible of one's posi- 
tive interests  into play,   at the same time giving  "all  the 
impulses  of which it  is  composed the greatest possible de- 
gree of freedom"   and  leading to —  or at least  not making 
impossible —  other  experiences  of the same kind.-^ 
Richards believes that this highly organized  type 
of experience has been sustained by relatively  few people, 
and they  are the poets.     He talks  of the two ways in which 
the ever-present conflicts  of the  Interests may be overcome 
— conquest  and conciliation —   and^f the great  superiority 
of the latter (a point which needs no further argument in 
the light  of modern psychiatric  attitudes) t 
Our impulses must have  some  order,   some organisation,   or 
we do not live ten minutes without disaster.       In the 
past,  Tradition,   a kind of Treaty of Versailles assign- 
ing frontiers  and   spheres  of influence to the different 
interests,   and based chiefly  on conquest,   ordered  our 
lives  in a moderately  satisfactory manner.     But Tradition 
is weakening.    Moral  authorities are not as well backed 
by beliefs  as they werejtheir  sanctions are declining in 
force.    We are in need of something to take the place of 
the old order.    Not in need  of a new balance of power,   a 
new arrangement  of conquests,  but  of a League of Nations 
for the moral   ordering  of the impulses;   a new order 
34.    Ibid.,  pp. 745-48. 
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based on conciliation,  not on attempted suppression. 
Only  the rarest individuals hitherto have achieved 
this new order,   and never yet perhaps completely.     But 
many have achieved it for a brief while,  for a particu- 
lar phase of   experience,   and many have recorded it  for 
these phases. 
Of these records poetry consists.35 
It may  at first  seem contradictory —   or perhaps  only  circ- 
ular —  to propose replacing the old  "moral   authorities"  with 
a new "moral   ordering of the impulses."    If traditional  mor- 
als   (like traditional   everything else,  it  seems)   are mean- 
ingless,  by what  standard  is this  new  order  "moral"?     The 
only  answer  apparent  in his  explanation is  simply that  it  is 
order;  this in itself  seems to be,   for Richards,   self-authen- 
ticating.    Perhaps,   according to this view,   the word   "moral" 
is as out-of-date as the word  "truth"   (in any  but the  scien- 
tific  sense);   and  for both  of them   should be substituted  a 
new term,  which would  itself  soon become evaluative:   Organi- 
zation.     While the old  "moral  authorities"   (which presumably 
refers to religious authorities)  would order life by  suppres- 
sion,  the new  "moral   ordering of the impulses"   (i.e.,   poetry) 
can achieve a more desirable end  by better meanst  conciliation. 
To accept the role Richards ifould give to poetry, 
It is necessary  first to accept Richards'   assumption that 
"experience is  its own  Justification."    Once this fact is 
faced,   Richards  tells us,   "it is apparent that  all the atti - 
tudes to other human beings  and  to the world in all  its as- 
35.    Ibid., p. 748. 
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pacts,   which have been  serviceable to humanity,   remain as 
they were,   as valuable as  ever."    Yet he admits that  "many 
of these attitudes., .are,   now that they   are being  set free, 
more difficult to maintain,  because we still hunger after  a 
basis in belief."56 
Neutralization of  Nature; 
How can Richards hold thiB view of life which seems 
to be at  once  sympathetic   and  —  to  some persons,   certainly 
— rather merciless?    The answer lies in what Richards  calls 
the Neutralization of Nature;   the downfall   of the "Magical 
View"  of the world  and  its replacement by the scientific,   a 
phenomenon which,   though it began much  earlier,   first teegan 
to cause noticeable trouble in the Victorian Era.     It was to 
this  "beginning"  that Trilling referred,   in connection with 
Matthew Arnold,   as the  "loss  of  a certain culture. "57 By 
the Magical  View Richards means  "roughly,   the belief in a 
world  of Spirits and Powers which control   events,   and  which 
can be  evoked  and,  to  some  extent,  controlled themselves by 
human practices":   in other words,  religion --  or as  some 
analysts would have it,   "animism."    While this view actually 
offered man little command over nature,  its appeal lay in 
the "ease and  adequacy with which the universe therein pre- 
sented  could be emotionally handled,   the scope offered  for 
man18 love and hatred,   for his terror as well  as for his 
36. ibid., p.  760. 
37. Supra, p. 9. 
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hope and his despair."     In its place is now a scientific  rev- 
olution which  "touches the central principle by which the 
Mind has been deliberately  organised  in the past"  —   a prin- 
ciple which must be replaced by  another if  equilibrium  is 
to be restored.5s 
The principle to which Richards  refers is the one 
mentioned   earlier in this paper,   the "pre-eminence of ration- 
ality."    Richards says that man has  supposed   since hie first 
grew reflective that  "his feelings,  his  attitudes,   and his 
conduct  spring from  his knowledge."    Although knowledge has 
"been until  recently too scarce"  for man to organize himself 
with knowledge as the foundation for his whole life,   still 
he has  sought for knowledge,   supposing that  it would  it- 
self directly excite a right  orientation to  existence, 
supposing that,   if he only knew what the world  was like, 
this knowledge in Itself would  show him how to feel 
towards it,   what attitudes  to adopt,   and  with what aims 
to live.     He has constantly called what he found  in this 
quest,   "knowledge,"  unaware that  it was hardly  ever pure, 
unaware.that his  feelings,   attitudes,   and behaviour were 
already  orientate* by his physiological  and   social  needs, 
and were themselves,   for the most part,   the  sources  of 
whatever  it was that he  supposed himself  to be knowing. 
Now, Richards  says,  man has  "genuine knowledge on a large 
scale";   now,   too,  he must  "recognise that pure knowledge is 
irrelevant to his aims,   that it has no direct bearing opon 
what he should feel,   or what he should  attempt to do.". 
For science,  which is simply our most elaborate way of 
pointing to things  systematically,  tells us and  oaa tell 
us nothing about the nature of things  in any ultimate 
sense.     It can never answer any question o** the form* 
v:hat  is  so and   so?    It can only tell  us how so and  so 
behaves.     And it does not attempt to  do mdre than this. 
38,     Ibid.,   pp.   752-54. 
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Nor,   indeed,   can more than this be done.     Those ancient, 
deeply  troubling,   formulations that begin with   "What" 
and  "Why" prove,   when we examine them,   to be not  ques- 
tions  at.all;   but requests —  for   emotional   satisfac- 
tion.     They  indicate our desire not for knowledge but 
for assurance.. ..Science can tell us about man's place 
in the universe and his chances; that the place is pre- 
carious,  and the chances problematical.    It can enorm- 
ously increase our chances if we can make wise use of 
it.    But it cannot tell us what we are or what this 
world is;  not because these are in any sense insoluble 
questions, but because they are not questions at all. 
"Arid, " Richards goes on, "if science cannot answer these 
pseudo-questions no more can phllosonhy or religion." The 
resulting crisis can be resolved, If at all, only by a re- 
organization of the mind — an organization, as we already 
know, approaching that which is found most perfectly in the 
poetic experience.  ' 
A perfectly legitimate question one may be tempted 
to ask here Is,"why poetry?"    What is there about poetry 
that gives It qualifications the other art forms do not 
have?    And the answer,  It would seem, must lie in that which 
distinguishes poetry from all  other arts* Its ambiguous med- 
ium, language. 
39.    Ibid., pp. 754-55. 
III.     THE IMPORTANCE OP WORDS 
It is ironical that Murray Krieger,  in his book 
The New Apologists for Poetry  (the most recent and valuable 
analysis of the so-called "New Critics"),  accuses I.A. 
Richards of the very crime which he commits in his anaylsis 
of Richards:  a neglect of words.    Not  only does he fail to 
take into account  several  of Richards'  most  significant 
points on this subject, however; he also fails to see one 
Important fact about Richards'  whole approach which is so 
obvious  one wonders at Krieger's own perspective.    In his 
most violent criticisms of Richards, Krieger attacks him for 
his description of the poetic process  "with almost no ref- 
erence to the medium" — a neglect "once more surprising, 
emerging as it does from a theorist whose interest In liter- 
ary problems seems largely motivated by his  semanticist's 
interest in language."^0    He is certainly  Justified in say- 
ing that  such a neglect on Richards' part, were it indeed  a 
neglect,  would be most surprising;  he is  quite mistaken in 
assuming that a neglect exists,  as even a cursory reading 
of Science and Poetry will  show. 
But the more general injustice Krieger does Richards, 
though not necessarily the more serious,   should perhaps be 
righted first.    While Krieger is working  on several  of the 
same problems that concerned Richards   (the primary one being 
40.    Krieger,  The New Apologists for Poetry, p.   59. 
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the plight  of poetry in a science-oriented culture), he 
approaches the question in a different manner*  as an aes- 
thetician concerned with establishing the autonomous exist- 
ence of a work of art,  he compares the theories of  (among 
other critics) Richards and Blot*1..in order to set forth 
his own poetics — forgetting,  apparently, that there exists 
between the two men a fundamental difference.    ELiot can 
describe the creative process as both poet and critic, while 
Richards never pretends to be acting in any  other capacity 
than that  of  a critic   (one whose main concern is the reader 
of poetry).    The truly surprising thing is not,  as Krieger 
would have us believe,  that Richards neglects the importance 
of the poet's medium as it figures in the creative process; 
it is rather that Richards,  in his comparatively limited 
view of the creative act,  yet shows a great  and valuable 
awareness of the medium. 42 
This  awareness  of the Importance of words is most 
evident in the chapter "The Command of Life"  of Science and 
Poetry,  a chapter which could be Justifiably  quoted in full. 
In the interests of space, however, we shall deal  only with 
those passages which best answer the charge of Krieger. 
41, (to the bad half of whose theory —  the objective correl- 
ative — the expression "once again surprising" j.n the 
above quotation refers)   • 
42. Anyone who has sampled Richards'  poetic  attempts  (all 
made in reoent years) knows how limited is his view from 
that  "end**  of the creative process. 
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The chief characteristic of poets ia their amazing 
command Of words. This is not a mere matter of vocab- 
ulary,  though it is significant that Shakespeare's 
vocabulary is the richest and most varied that any 
Englishman has  ever used.     It is not the quantity  of 
words  a writer has at his disposal,  but the way in 
which he disposes them that gives him his rank as a 
poet.     His  sense of how they modify one another,  how 
their separate effects in the mind combine,  how they 
fit into the-' whole response, .is what matters.    As a 
rule the poet is not conscious of the reason why  Just 
these words and no others best serve.    They fall  into 
their place without his conscious control,   and a feel- 
ing of Tightness,   of inevitability is commonly his sole 
conscious ground for his certainty that he has ordered 
them aright.    It would as  a rule be idle to ask him why 
he use* a particular rhythm or a particular epithet. 
He might give reasons, but they would probably be mere 
rationalizations having nothing to do tlth the matter. 
For the choice of the rhythm  or the epithet was not an 
intellectual matter (though it may be capable of an 
intellectual   Justification),  but was*due to an instinct- 
ive impulse seeking to. confirm itself,  or to  order it- 
self with its fellows.43 
Is this the same instinctive element of the poetic process 
that Aristotle spoke of?    At any rate,  these are hardly the 
words of one who neglects the importance of the language 
medium. 
Yet Krieger is not merely charging Richards with a 
lack of emphasis in one area; he is at the same time crit- 
icizing him for  over-emphasis in another: 
The characteristic which sets off the artist for 
Richards,  it must be noted,  is not at all the artist's 
craft in working in a given material;  it is his healthy 
organization of impulses which allows him to undergo 
such rich experiences. 
A careful reading of Richards will prove Krieger wrong on 
43. Richards,  Science and Poetry, p. 7*9. 
44. Krieger,  The New Apologists for Poetry, p.   59. 
» 
one,  if not on two counts.    Regardless of the truth or fals- 
ity of Richards'  theory of neurological organization,   sheer 
logical  analysis  of his view shows there is no "either-or" 
relationship between the poet's use of words  and his use of 
experience!  there is  an  essential tie that makes his  "style" 
of writing the direct result of his  "style"  of living. 
It is very important to realize how deep  are the 
motives which govern the poet's use of words.    No study 
of other poets which is not an impassioned study will 
help him.     He can learn much from other poets, but  only 
by letting them influence him deeply, not by any super- 
ficial  examination of their style.    For the motives which 
shape a poem  spring from the root of the mind.    The 
poet's style is  a direct outcome of the way in which his 
interests are organized.    That amazing capacity of his 
for ordering  speech is only a part of a more amazing 
capacity for  ordering his  experience.  • 
Thus,  for Richards,   one can command words only when one can, 
in a psychological  sense,  command life.    The poet is not 
someone who simply has achieved what Krieger calls  "fine 
neurological  organization"  or "extreme mental health"  and 
decided  (out of the goodness of his heart,  one must suppose) 
to "communicate to a more poorly organized public    Chis] 
highly elaborate experience";^    rather he is someone in- 
volved in a process  so mysterious that the product,  if not 
genuine,  is characteristically given away by its rhythm. 
For rhythm is no matter of tricks with syllables,  but 
directly refleots personality.    It is not separable 
from the words to which it belongs.    Moving rhythm in 
45. Richards,   Science and Poetry, pp.  749-50. 
46. Krieger, Jhe New Apologists for Poetry,  p.   58. 
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poetry arises only from genuinely stirred impulses,   and 
is a more subtle index than any other to the order of 
the interests.4' 
Krieger's most serious objection to Richards'  theory 
of the creative process  (and to Eliot's notion of the ob- 
jective correlative)   Is that the artist  "apparently does 
not need the expressive act to create or,  indeed,   even to 
organize his experience."    Krieger interprets Richards as 
saying that "the experience exists,  in its complete form, 
prior to the act of communication."^0    That Richards is not 
saying that at all  is obvious from what he does «ayt 
Misunderstanding and under-estimation of poetry is 
mainly due to over-estimation of the thought in it.    We 
can see still more clearly that thought is not the prime 
factor if we consider for a moment not the experience o 
of the reader but that of the poet.    Why does the poet 
use these words and no others?    Not because they stand 
for a series of thoughts which in themselves  are what 
he is concerned to communicate.    It  is never what a 
poem  says which matters,  but what it is.    The poet is 
not writing as a scientist.    He uses these words because 
the interests which the  situation calls into play com- 
bine to bring them,   flust in this form,  into his con- 
sciousness as a means of  ordering;,  controlling and con- 
solidating the whole experience.    The experience itself, 
the tide of impulses sweeping through the mind,  is the 
source and sanction of the words.    They represent this 
experience itself,  not any  set of perceptions  or re- 
flections,  though often to a reader who approaches the 
poem wrongly they will  seem to be only a series of re- 
marks  about other things.    But to a suitable reader the 
words — if they actually spring from experience and 
are not due to verbal habits,  to the desire to be ef- 
fective,  to factitious excogitation,  to imitation,  to 
irrelevant contrivances,   or to any other of the failings 
which prevent most people from writing poetry — the 
words will reproduce in his mind a similar play of 
47. Richards,  Science and Poetry,  p. 750. 
48. Krieger,  TJig New Apologists for Poetry,  p.  67. 
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interests putting him for the while inte a similar sit- 
uation and leading to the same response. 
Why this  should  happen is  still   somewhat of a mystery. 
An extraordinarily intricate concourse of impulses 
brings the words together.     Then in another mind the 
affair in part reverses itself,  the words bring into 
being a similar concourse of impulses.    The words which 
seem to be the effect of the experience in the first 
instance,   seem to become the cause of a similar exper- 
ience in the second.    A very odd thing to happen,  not 
exactly paralleled outside communication.    But this de- 
scription is not quite accurate.    The words,  as we have 
seen,  are not simply the effect in one case,  nor the 
cause in the other.    In both cases they are the part of 
the experience which binds it together, which gives it 
a definite structure and keeps it from being a mere wel- 
ter of disconnected impulses.    They are the key.. .for 
this particular combination of impulses.     So regarded, 
it is less  strange that what the poet wrote should.re- 
produce his  experience in the mind of the reader. y 
Less  obvious,  perhaps,   than Krieger's misunderstand- 
ing of   Richards on this point is the underlying reason for 
itt the two critics hold views    of the poem as aesthetic 
object that are basically opposed.    For Richards,   as we have 
already seen, poetry is an experience essentially like any 
other, though of course more valuable;  there is no such 
thing as an "aesthetic  experience";5° and the values which 
govern poetry are no different from those which govern all 
the rest of life.    Richards'  artist discovers relations be- 
tween the different elements of life (whether these elements 
be words or picnics,  or a combination of both), thus creat- 
ing order and meaning in life,  which is — to the imagina- 
tive mind of the poet — itsKLff poetry.    Krieger's whole 
49. Richards,  Science and Poetry, pp. 744-45. 
50. See Principles of Literary Criticism. Chapters II and X. 
purpose,  on the other hand,  is to establish the autonom- 
ous existence of a work of art.    While the so-called "aes- 
thetic  object"  is  nothing to Richards,   it  is  everything to 
Krieger. 
To ask which of them is "right" is to ask a pseudo- 
question.    At least one matter on which they seemed to dif- 
fer — the importance of words in the creative process — 
turned out to be largely a matter of misinterpretation on 
Krieger's part;   perhaps the other differences,  given proper 
attention, might resolve themselves as easily.    In all fair- 
ness to Krieger, it must be said that if he is unfair where 
Richards is concerned,  he redeems himself by holding up as 
valuable T.E.   Hulme's view of the creative process* 
For Hulme the poet cannot hope to have fresh  insights 
into experience unless he has the ability to bend to 
the service of these insights the medium by means of 
which they are to take shape.    If most people Bee the 
world in a stereotyped manner, it is because they are 
limited by their stereotyped use of language*  fixed 
patterns of language dictate fixed patterns of thought. 
Thus for Hulme there can be no pre-existing fresh idea 
for which the poet then seeks fresh embodiment.    The 
idea becomes fresh as it is worked by him across the 
grain of language habits.    It emerges unique as his 
Individual,  and thus unique,  purposes triumphantly elude 
the persuasive grooves of common passage.    Thus the Idea 
does not merely take place in language;  the language is 
the Idea — an objectified and communicable phenomenon, 
not merely a mental and purely private one.3* 
While Krieger presents this view as one which is basically 
different from Richards'  own (and better, for that reason), 
we now know enough about Richards' poetics — particularly 
51.    Krieger, The New Apologists for Poetry,  p. 67. 
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that part of it dealing with the importance of words in the 
creative process — to see that Richards Is himself saying 
essentially the same thing. 
39 
IV.     CONCLUSION 
We have seen how all Richards'   theories  about poetry 
have their origin in tfeif theories about psychology  and lan- 
guage: from the basic distinction between the two kinds of 
language to the corresponding one between the two kinds of 
statement,  and thence to the peculiar kind of neurological 
organization which  is  effected  in usW what he calls pseudo- 
statement.    And we have seen,  too, Richards' world view,  in 
which  (as Matthew Arnold predicted)  religion and philosophy 
have failed  — in which only poetry is left,   and poetry 
(like all  other experiences in life)  is its own Justificatipn. 
What are the implications of this view for poetry itself? 
Interestingly enough,  it leads Richards to the same conclu- 
sion that Aristotle reached (and,  perhaps,  for basically the 
same reason) — that tragedy is the highest form of poetry. 
Of course,  Richards would translate that last statement into 
"perhaps the most general,  all-accepting,  all-ordering ex- 
perience known," but it comes to the same thing.    It is 
essential  to recognize that "in the full tragic experience 
there is no suppression"; that the mind is shorn of its de- 
fenses and illusions and all the "devices by which we endeav- 
our to avoid the issues which might bewilder us.    The 
essence of Tragedy  fand, we might say, the essence of I.A. 
4o 
Richards] is that it forces us to live for a moment with- 
out them."52 
This same idea is present in Richards' praise of 
Hardy as the    contemporary    "poet who has most steadily re- 
fused to be comforted" by either forgetfulness or beliefs, 
Richards explains his "singular preoccupation with death" 
by saying "It is In the contemplation of death that the 
necessity for huraen attitudes,  in the face of an indifferent 
universe, to become self-supporting,  is felt most poignant- 
ly.    Only the greatest tragic poets have achieved  an equally 
self-reliant and immitigable acceptance."5      The poetry, 
then,  is there;  and as Richards tells us in the last sen- 
tences of Science and Poetry, 
It is capable of saving us;  it is a perfectly possible 
means of overcoming chaos.    But whether man is capable 
of the reorientation required, whether he can loosen in 
time the entanglement with belief which now takes from 
poetry half its power and would then take all,  Is another 
question,  andvtoo large for the scope of this essay.^ 
The question is too large for the scope of this essay as 
well — or of any other;  the answer must come,  in the last 
analysis,  from the poets themselves* and from their readers. 
52. Richards, Principles of Literary Criticism, p. 246. 
53. Richards,  Science and Poetry, p. 761. 
54- Iblfli^ p. 766. 
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